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20092026
most citedLearning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games

20 citations · 145 across the 58 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2019Show all

10 papers · 1 filter

cs.AI2019★ 4 cited

Coordination in Adversarial Sequential Team Games via Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning

Andrea Celli, Marco Ciccone, Raffaele Bongo +1

Many real-world applications involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a common goal against potential adversaries. This paper focuses on zero-sum game…

cs.GT2019★ 3 cited

Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces

Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò, Nicola Gatti

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a…

cs.AI2019

Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition

Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti, Giulia Landriani +1

We focus on the election manipulation problem through social influence, where a manipulator exploits a social network to make her most preferred candidate win an election. Influenc…

cs.GT2019★ 20 cited

Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games

Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Tommaso Bianchi +1

In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to so…

cs.GT2019

Persuading Voters: It's Easy to Whisper, It's Hard to Speak Loud

Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti

We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their be…

cs.AI2019★ 3 cited

Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games

Andrea Celli, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Gatti

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from ac…