16 citations · 55 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2016★ 14 cited
Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers
Christopher A Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh +1
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable const…
cs.GT2016
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions
Rad Niazadeh, Christopher Wilkens
Quasiliearity is a ubiquitous and questionable assumption in the standard study of Walrasian equilibria. Quasilinearity implies that a buyer's value for goods purchased in a Walras…