activity
20102019
most citedPacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

16 citations · 55 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

cs.GT2019

The Ad Types Problem

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers +1

The Ad Types Problem (without gap rules) is a special case of the assignment problem in which there are types of nodes on one side (the ads), and an ordered set of nodes on the…

cs.DS2019

Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems

Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan +1

We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at…

cs.GT2018★ 16 cited

Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi +4

Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level campaign management tools to help advertisers run their campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how each ad is p…

cs.GT2017★ 1 cited

Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads

Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, Maxim Sviridenko +1

The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed…

cs.GT2017★ 7 cited

GSP - The Cinderella of Mechanism Design

Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh

Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- th…

cs.GT2016★ 14 cited

Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers

Christopher A Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh +1

In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable const…