9 citations · 9 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may…
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy
We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a pr…
Coopetitive Ad Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show tha…