9 citations · 9 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2013
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may…
cs.GT2013
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy
We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a pr…
cs.GT2012★ 9 cited
Coopetitive Ad Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show tha…