13 citations · 24 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria
Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Samuel Taggart
Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust…
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers
Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid f…
Efficiency Guarantees from Data
Darrell Hoy, Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarch…
Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue
Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of…
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may…