7 citations · 8 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads
Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, Maxim Sviridenko +1
The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed…
GSP - The Cinderella of Mechanism Design
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh
Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- th…
Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers
Christopher A Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh +1
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable const…