122 citations · 256 across the 36 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 2 filters
The Complexity of Multiwinner Voting Rules with Variable Number of Winners
Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules t…
Cognitive Hierarchy and Voting Manipulation
Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi +1
By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters ca…
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games for k-Approval Voting Rules
Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi +1
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given pr…