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20092026
most citedSwap Bribery

122 citations · 256 across the 36 of their papers we have counts for

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22 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026★ 1 cited

How Similar Are Two Elections?

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko +3

We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invaria…

cs.GT2022

How to Sample Approval Elections?

Stanisław Szufa, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko +4

We study the multifaceted question of how to sample approval elections in a meaningful way. Our analysis aims to discern the properties of various statistical cultures (both establ…

cs.GT2019

What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-Francois Laslier +3

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to t…

cs.GT2018★ 10 cited

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko +1

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natur…

cs.GT2017★ 11 cited

The Complexity of Multiwinner Voting Rules with Variable Number of Winners

Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules t…

cs.GT2017★ 1 cited

Cognitive Hierarchy and Voting Manipulation

Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi +1

By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters ca…