28 citations · 28 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira
The design of credible auctions---mechanisms where a revenue-maximizing auctioneer has no incentive to deviate from the protocol---faces a fundamental cryptographic barrier when th…
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast
Tarun Chitra, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Kshitij Kulkarni
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to…
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, David C. Parkes
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status…
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "get…
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes +1
In recent years, prominent blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have experienced explosive growth in transaction volume, leading to frequent surges in demand for limited…
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, an…