10 citations · 16 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
Michele Fabi, Viraj Nadkarni, Leonardo Leone +1
We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Fi…
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan +3
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a paradigm employed by modern Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols to select a block-proposing "leader." Algorand [Chen and Micali, 2019] proposes a c…
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols, such as Algorand. In cryptographic self-selection, each round $r…
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strateg…