2 citations · 4 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider, Hanrui Zhang
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will play a role when the primary utility of the outcomes is the same. We show that in such cases, a mec…
Bayesian Conversations
Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider, Heyang Shang +1
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a m…
The Power of Menus in Contract Design
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang +1
We study the power of menus of contracts in principal-agent problems with adverse selection (agents can be one of several types) and moral hazard (we cannot observe agent actions d…
Is Learning in Games Good for the Learners?
William Brown, Jon Schneider, Kiran Vodrahalli
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{gene…
Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability
Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of bidders where: a) bidders have a per-round individual rationality constraint, b) bidders may leave the mecha…
Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang
In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical princip…