1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Local non-bossiness
Eduardo Duque, Juan S. Pereyra, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a studen…
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen, Juan S. Pereyra
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The stude…
Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions
Li Chen, Juan S. Pereyra, Min Zhu
Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform their static counterparts. The college admissions procedure used in Inner Mongolia motivates an underexplore…
Rawlsian Assignments
Tom Demeulemeester, Juan S. Pereyra
We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Existing literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; cons…