3 papers
econ.TH2024
Local non-bossiness
Eduardo Duque, Juan S. Pereyra, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a studen…
econ.GN2023
Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment
Alvaro Forteza, Irene Mussio, Juan S Pereyra
If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government's abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment…
econ.TH2022
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen, Juan S. Pereyra
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The stude…