5 papers
Secret Communication with Plausible Deniability
Xiaoyu Cheng, Yonggyun Kim, Michael P. H. Tam
Communication is secret if a message is independent of the state; however, the receiver's subsequent action may still reveal that she has acted on hidden information. This paper st…
On the Monotonicity of Information Costs
Xiaoyu Cheng, Yonggyun Kim
We study the monotonicity of information costs: more informative experiments must be more costly. As criteria for informativeness, we consider the standard information orders intro…
Improving Robust Decisions with Data
Xiaoyu Cheng
A decision-maker faces uncertainty governed by a data-generating process (DGP), which is only known to belong to a set of sequences of independent but possibly non-identical distri…
Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity
Xiaoyu Cheng
Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from us…
Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation
Xiaoyu Cheng
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information…