25 citations · 116 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea th…
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player rol…
Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. The…
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, an…