25 citations · 116 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Attention and Social Learning
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
In an incentivized laboratory experiment, we study how people account for and respond to others' incentives for paying attention. Participants learn a binary state from an attentio…
Learning from Viral Information
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
Motivated by social media, we study an equilibrium model of agents interacting with and learning from each other's signals. Rational agents arrive sequentially, observe a signal (c…
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models
Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use domin…
Private Private Information
Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called "private," they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces…
Screening -Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait
Federico Echenique, Kevin He
We show that adding noise before publishing data effectively screens -hacked findings: spurious explanations produced by fitting many statistical models (data mining). Noise cre…
Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications
Kevin He, Jonathan Libgober
Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)speci…
Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors' actions, the network structure often causes information loss. We consider rati…
An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
We conduct a sequential social-learning experiment where subjects each guess a hidden state based on private signals and the guesses of a subset of their predecessors. A network de…
Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News
Jetlir Duraj, Kevin He
A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption ("news utility"), with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news…
Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler's Fallacy and Other Correlational Mistakes in Optimal-Stopping Problems
Kevin He
I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain a…
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea th…
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player rol…
Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning
Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He
We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. The…
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, an…
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He, Lorens Imhof
We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or…