activity
20162026
most citedNetwork Structure and Naive Sequential Learning

25 citations · 116 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

15 papers

econ.TH2026

Attention and Social Learning

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

In an incentivized laboratory experiment, we study how people account for and respond to others' incentives for paying attention. Participants learn a binary state from an attentio…

econ.TH2022

Learning from Viral Information

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

Motivated by social media, we study an equilibrium model of agents interacting with and learning from each other's signals. Rational agents arrive sequentially, observe a signal (c…

econ.TH2022★ 3 cited

Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models

Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use domin…

econ.TH2021★ 1 cited

Private Private Information

Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz

Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called "private," they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces…

econ.TH2021

Screening -Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait

Federico Echenique, Kevin He

We show that adding noise before publishing data effectively screens -hacked findings: spurious explanations produced by fitting many statistical models (data mining). Noise cre…

econ.TH2020★ 1 cited

Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

Kevin He, Jonathan Libgober

Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)speci…

econ.TH2019★ 5 cited

Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors' actions, the network structure often causes information loss. We consider rati…

econ.TH2019★ 11 cited

An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

We conduct a sequential social-learning experiment where subjects each guess a hidden state based on private signals and the guesses of a subset of their predecessors. A network de…

econ.TH2019★ 1 cited

Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News

Jetlir Duraj, Kevin He

A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption ("news utility"), with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news…

econ.GN2018★ 15 cited

Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler's Fallacy and Other Correlational Mistakes in Optimal-Stopping Problems

Kevin He

I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain a…

econ.TH2017★ 6 cited

Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He

Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea th…

econ.TH2017★ 15 cited

Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games

Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player rol…

econ.GN2017★ 25 cited

Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. The…

econ.GN2017★ 21 cited

Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games

Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He

Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, an…

math.ST2016★ 12 cited

Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events

Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He, Lorens Imhof

We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or…