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cs.IT2026
Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver?
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition b…
cs.IT2026
Strategic Persuasion Through Information Timeliness
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
We study a dynamic strategic communication problem in which a sender controls the timing of truthful updates from binary continuous-time Markov sources. The receiver chooses betwee…
cs.IT2025
Timely Information for Strategic Persuasion
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the…