4 papers
Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver?
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition b…
Keep, Customize, or Exit: Default Design and Token Pricing in LLM Reasoning Services
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Yigit Turkmen, Melih Bastopcu
We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize…
Strategic Persuasion Through Information Timeliness
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
We study a dynamic strategic communication problem in which a sender controls the timing of truthful updates from binary continuous-time Markov sources. The receiver chooses betwee…
Timely Information for Strategic Persuasion
Ahmet Bugra Gundogan, Melih Bastopcu
This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the…