1 citations · 2 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
Paul Duetting, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme +2
We investigate auction mechanisms for AI-generated content, focusing on applications like ad creative generation. In our model, agents' preferences over stochastically generated co…
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of Dütting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, the…
Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz +1
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minim…