6 citations · 14 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2016 · cs.GTShow all
2 papers · 2 filters
cs.GT2016★ 3 cited
Almost Budget Balanced Mechanisms with Scalar Bids For Allocation of a Divisible Good
D. Thirumulanathan, H. Vinay, Srikrishna Bhashyam +1
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information beca…
cs.GT2016★ 5 cited
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y Narahari
We consider the design of a revenue-optimal mechanism when two items are available to be sold to a single buyer whose valuation is uniformly distributed over an arbitrary rectangle…