6 citations · 14 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
On Deterministic Optimal Mechanisms in a Two-Item Setting for Distributions with Nondecreasing Density
Thirumulanathan D
Consider the problem of designing a revenue-optimal auction mechanism when two heterogeneous items are sold to a single buyer having independent valuations over the items. The dist…
On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y Narahari
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-optimal mechanism in the two-item, single-buyer, unit-demand setting when the buyer's valuations, , are uniformly distrib…
Almost Budget Balanced Mechanisms with Scalar Bids For Allocation of a Divisible Good
D. Thirumulanathan, H. Vinay, Srikrishna Bhashyam +1
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information beca…
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y Narahari
We consider the design of a revenue-optimal mechanism when two items are available to be sold to a single buyer whose valuation is uniformly distributed over an arbitrary rectangle…