From the 1 of 17 linked papers with an AI index.
17 papers
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
The paper defines the problem of compensation design, proposing simple cost‑oblivious payment rules that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria with a price of anarchy clo…
Gradient Dynamics in First-Price Auctions: Iterative Strategy Elimination via Cubic Potentials
Mete Åeref Ahunbay, Weiqiang Zheng, Tao Lin
We show that in discretised first-price auctions with complete information, if the buyers learn to bid with online gradient ascent, in time-average the outcome is (almost) the effi…
Accelerating Min-Max Optimization via Power-Law Stepsizes
Yue Wu, Weiqiang Zheng, Yang Cai +1
We revisit the convergence guarantees of the Extragradient (EG) method for unconstrained biaffine min-max optimization. It is known that EG with a fixed stepsize achieves a $Î(T^{…
Last-Iterate Convergence of Anchored Gradient Descent
Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng
We study the monotone inclusion problem , where is monotone and Lipschitz, and is maximally monotone, a framework that encompasses monotone variational ineq…
Is Online Linear Optimization Sufficient for Strategic Robustness?
Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei +1
We consider bidding in repeated Bayesian first-price auctions. Bidding algorithms that achieve optimal regret have been extensively studied, but their strategic robustness to the s…