#mechanism design
12 papers · 1 filter
Paying for Honesty Without Knowing the Truth: Reputation-Penalty Design for LLM Marketplace Agents
Mingdai Yang, Shicheng Fan, Kejing Yu +5
The paper proposes CARP, a reputation‑penalty mechanism that discourages LLM agents from fabricating product attributes without needing ground‑truth verification, and shows that co…
Reversing Reserve Logic: Optimal Holdback in Local Allocation under Scalable Entry
Hiroaki Odahara
The paper designs and analyzes a screening rule for allocating scarce resources when participant accounts cannot be trusted, aiming to maximize the utility of intended users while…
MESHA: Mechanism-Enforced Sequential Halving for Strategic Linear Bandits
Xin Li, Zixin Zhong
The paper proposes MESHA, a mechanism‑enforced sequential halving algorithm that identifies the best arm in linear bandits where arms may misreport their features strategically, an…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
The paper defines the problem of compensation design, proposing simple cost‑oblivious payment rules that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria with a price of anarchy clo…
Coordinating Treatment Allocation and Recommendation
Li Guo, Penghuan Yan
The paper examines how a sender can allocate limited treatment to agents of unknown quality and later recommend them to a receiver, showing that jointly coordinating treatment allo…
When Is Delegated Play Truthful? Within-Range Regret and the Trilemma of Aligned Delegation
Taksch Dube
The paper studies when a principal should honestly describe their preferences to an automated proxy (such as an autobidder or language‑model agent), showing that honesty is optimal…