From the 1 of 5 linked papers with an AI index.
5 papers
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
The paper defines the problem of compensation design, proposing simple cost‑oblivious payment rules that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria with a price of anarchy clo…
A Unified Approach to Submodular Maximization Under Noise
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yang Cai, Zhe Feng +2
We consider the problem of maximizing a submodular function with access to a noisy value oracle for the function instead of an exact value oracle. Similar to prior work, we assume…
Risk-Averse and Optimistic Advertiser Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding
Christopher Liaw, Wennan Zhu
The rise of auto-bidding has created challenges for ensuring advertiser incentive compatibility, particularly when advertisers delegate bidding to agents with high-level constraint…
Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw +2
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given b…