From the 1 of 10 linked papers with an AI index.
10 papers
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
The paper defines the problem of compensation design, proposing simple cost‑oblivious payment rules that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria with a price of anarchy clo…
A Unified Approach to Submodular Maximization Under Noise
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yang Cai, Zhe Feng +2
We consider the problem of maximizing a submodular function with access to a noisy value oracle for the function instead of an exact value oracle. Similar to prior work, we assume…
Sponsored Questions and How to Auction Them
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Alexandros Psomas, Di Wang
Online platforms connect users with relevant products and services using ads. A key challenge is that a user's search query often leaves their true intent ambiguous. Typically, pla…
The Average-Value Allocation Problem
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Zhe Feng, Anupam Gupta +3
We initiate the study of centralized algorithms for welfare-maximizing allocation of goods to buyers subject to average-value constraints. We show that this problem is NP-hard to a…
Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content
Santiago Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng +7
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenge…