153 citations · 816 across the 54 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 2 filters
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer, Pitchayut Jirapinyo +3
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requir…
Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation proble…
Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh
Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Each agent's local decision problem is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) and agents must coordinate o…
Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation
Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
In addressing the challenge of exponential scaling with the number of agents we adopt a cluster-based representation to approximately solve asymmetric games of very many players. A…
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions
Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties…