153 citations · 816 across the 54 of their papers we have counts for
30 papers · 1 filter
Belief Elicitation from Agents with Competing Incentives
Manuel Wuthrich, Mark York, David C. Parkes
We study the problem of eliciting beliefs about an uncertain future event, where the reported beliefs are used to inform a decision. Unlike the standard model of belief elicitation…
Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers
Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp +5
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-game…
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, David C. Parkes
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status…
Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design
Zhou Fan, Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío, Ben Altschuler +3
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) provide a means for users to trade pairs of assets on-chain without the need for a trusted third party to effectuate a trade. Amongst these, constant…
Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment
Mark York, Munther Dahleh, David Parkes
Access to capital is a major constraint for economic growth in the developing world. Yet those attempting to lend in this space face high defaults due to their inability to disting…
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li +3
We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility…