collaborators

8 papers

cs.LG2026

Multi-Token Prediction and Alternative Tokenization Improve Learning Latent Multi-Hop Graph Search at Scale

Arvid Frydenlund, FuTe Wong, Katherine Lambert +1

Given an unseen graph, a start node, , and an end node, , can a language model generate the shortest path from to ? Prior work has found that models fail to learn this…

cs.LG2026

Removing Information Content Does Not Certify Tamper Resistance in Open-Weight Models

Domenic Rosati, Alessa Carbo, Ali Dadsetan +5

Does removing harmful information make open-weight models resistant to fine-tuning attacks? We show that mutual information at release alone cannot universally certify slow recover…

cs.LG2026

Distribution-Specific Curvature Control with Finite-Sample Guarantees for Open-Weight Safety

Domenic Rosati, Ali Dadsetan, Hong Huang +5

A short fine-tuning run can undo the safety guards of an open-weight model---retraining a refusal-trained assistant to aid weapons development or produce hate speech. Preventing su…

math.OC2026

Limits of Convergence-Rate Control for Open-Weight Safety

Domenic Rosati, Xijie Zeng, Hong Huang +4

Open-weight foundation models can be fine-tuned for harmful purposes after release, yet no existing training resistance methods provide theoretical guarantees. Treating these inter…

cs.LG2024

Evaluating Defences against Unsafe Feedback in RLHF

Domenic Rosati, Giles Edkins, Harsh Raj +5

While there has been progress towards aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values and ensuring safe behaviour at inference time, safety guards can easily be removed whe…

cs.CL2024

Representation Noising: A Defence Mechanism Against Harmful Finetuning

Domenic Rosati, Jan Wehner, Kai Williams +7

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release o…

cs.CL2024

Long-form evaluation of model editing

Domenic Rosati, Robie Gonzales, Jinkun Chen +6

Evaluations of model editing currently only use the `next few token' completions after a prompt. As a result, the impact of these methods on longer natural language generation is l…

cs.CL2024

Immunization against harmful fine-tuning attacks

Domenic Rosati, Jan Wehner, Kai Williams +4

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often trained with safety guards intended to prevent harmful text generation. However, such safety training can be removed by fine-tuning the LLM o…