3 papers
cs.GT2026
The Computable but Not Learnable Information-Value-Free Equilibria and Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion
Jason D. Hartline, Chang Wang, Chenhao Zhang
A correlated equilibrium is information-value-free if every player has an action that yields the same payoff as their equilibrium strategy when all other players follow their respe…
econ.TH2026
Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
Jason Hartline
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total au…
cs.GT2011
Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to en…