activity
20082026
most citedBayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

26 citations · 168 across the 46 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

58 papers

econ.TH2026

Robustness in Mechanism Design

Jason Hartline

The article reviews the robust design and analysis of auctions, focusing on the predominant paradigm in the computer science literature, which quantifies robustness by the worst-ca…

econ.TH2026

The Economics of No-regret Learning Algorithms

Jason Hartline

A fundamental challenge for modern economics is to understand what happens when actors in an economy are replaced with algorithms. Like rationality has enabled understanding of out…

cs.LG2025

Truthful Calibration Errors for Multi-Class Prediction

Yuxuan Lu, Yifan Wu, Jason Hartline +1

Calibrated predictions are useful because their numerical values can be interpreted as probabilities. Calibration errors are therefore widely used to evaluate, compare, and tune pr…

cs.GT2025

A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade

Jason Hartline, Kangning Wang

We provide a geometric proof that the random proposer mechanism is a -approximation to the first-best gains from trade in bilateral exchange. We then refine this geometric analy…

cs.GT2025

Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion, Refined: Testing Pessimistic Calibrated Regret

Jason D. Hartline, Chang Wang, Chenhao Zhang

We study the regulation of algorithmic (non-)collusion amongst sellers in dynamic imperfect price competition by auditing their data as introduced by Hartline et al. [2024]. We dev…

cs.CY2024

Error-Tolerant E-Discovery Protocols

Jinshuo Dong, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan +1

We consider the multi-party classification problem introduced by Dong, Hartline, and Vijayaraghavan (2022) in the context of electronic discovery (e-discovery). Based on a request…