24 citations · 163 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for
17 papers · 1 filter
Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions
Ziyun Chen, Zhiyi Huang, Dorsa Majdi +1
Consider Myerson's optimal auction with respect to an inaccurate prior, e.g., estimated from data, which is an underestimation of the true value distribution. Can the auctioneer ex…
Class Fairness in Online Matching
Hadi Hosseini, Zhiyi Huang, Ayumi Igarashi +1
In the classical version of online bipartite matching, there is a given set of offline vertices (aka agents) and another set of vertices (aka items) that arrive online. When each i…
Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design
Yihang Hu, Zhiyi Huang, Yiheng Shen +1
This paper introduces the targeted sampling model in optimal auction design. In this model, the seller may specify a quantile interval and sample from a buyer's prior restricted to…
Algorithmic Price Discrimination
Rachel Cummings, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design…
Generalizing Complex Hypotheses on Product Distributions: Auctions, Prophet Inequalities, and Pandora's Problem
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1
This paper explores a theory of generalization for learning problems on product distributions, complementing the existing learning theories in the sense that it does not rely on an…
Settling the Sample Complexity of Single-parameter Revenue Maximization
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, Xinzhi Zhang
This paper settles the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization by showing matching upper and lower bounds, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, for all families of v…
Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders
Zhiyi Huang, Jinyan Liu, Xiangning Wang
We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the s…
Multi-scale Online Learning and its Applications to Online Auctions
Sébastien Bubeck, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted p…
The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information
Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Christos-Alexandros Psomas
Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d., or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her va…
Budget Constraints in Prediction Markets
Nikhil Devanur, Miroslav Dudík, Zhiyi Huang +1
We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget con…
Making the Most of Your Samples
Zhiyi Huang, Yishay Mansour, Tim Roughgarden
We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution . The seller has "data"' about in the form of i.i…
Private Matchings and Allocations
Justin Hsu, Zhiyi Huang, Aaron Roth +2
We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partiti…
Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
Yang Cai, Zhiyi Huang
We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multi-item multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have…
Sequential Auctions of Identical Items with Budget-Constrained Bidders
Zhiyi Huang, Nikhil R. Devanur, David Malec
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We co…
The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal
Zhiyi Huang, Sampath Kannan
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism wh…
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments
Xiaohui Bei, Zhiyi Huang
Very recently, Hartline and Lucier studied single-parameter mechanism design problems in the Bayesian setting. They proposed a black-box reduction that converted Bayesian approxima…
Dynamic and Non-Uniform Pricing Strategies for Revenue Maximization
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Zhiyi Huang, Sanjeev Khanna
We consider the Item Pricing problem for revenue maximization in the limited supply setting, where a single seller with items caters to buyers with unknown subadditive valu…