3 papers
cs.GT2025
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang +2
We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the…
cs.GT2025
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
Shuchi Chawla, Trung Dang, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider a combinatorial auction setting where buyers have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations over the items and the seller's objective is to maximize the social welfare.…
cs.DS2024
Robust Max Selection
Trung Dang, Zhiyi Huang
We introduce a new model to study algorithm design under unreliable information, and apply this model for the problem of finding the uncorrupted maximum element of a list containin…