381 citations · 2.3k across the 89 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 2 filters
Robust Mediators in Large Games
Michael Kearns, Mallesh M. Pai, Ryan Rogers +2
A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of all agents' reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what is achieva…
Do Prices Coordinate Markets?
Justin Hsu, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan Rogers +2
Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most pr…
The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models
Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh M. Pai +1
We study how privacy technologies affect user and advertiser behavior in a simple economic model of targeted advertising. In our model, a consumer first decides whether or not to b…
Computer-aided verification in mechanism design
Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias +3
In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (po…
Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators
Ryan Rogers, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman +1
We revisit a classic coordination problem from the perspective of mechanism design: how can we coordinate a social welfare maximizing flow in a network congestion game with selfish…