74 citations · 185 across the 47 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 2 filters
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…
Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models
Moshe Babaioff, Sigal Oren
We study a variant of Vickrey's classic bottleneck model. In our model there are agents and each agent strategically chooses when to join a first-come-first-served observable q…
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory (e.g., [Kleinberg and Oren,…
Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Aviad Rubinstein
We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest case for which Myerson's characterization does not hold: a single seller selling two items, with independ…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour +1
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished in recent years at the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic comp…