74 citations · 185 across the 47 of their papers we have counts for
57 papers
Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation
Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige, Noam Manaker Morag
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuations. Motivated by impossibility results for deterministic truthful mechanisms, we focus on…
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…
Pareto-Efficient Multi-Buyer Mechanisms: Characterization, Fairness and Welfare
Moshe Babaioff, Sijin Chen, Zhaohua Chen +1
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontie…
Strengthening Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Multi-Unit Auctions
Moshe Babaioff, Yiding Feng, Zihan Luo
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) shows that in multi-unit auctions with units and buyers whose values are sampled i.i.d. from a regular distribution,…
Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
Moshe Babaioff, Rotem Gil, Assaf Romm
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences mi…
Near-Optimal Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Few Agents
Moshe Babaioff, Gefen Frosh
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations, aiming for Best-of-Both-Worlds (BoBW) fairness: a distribution over allocatio…