31 citations · 144 across the 37 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations
Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari +1
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a fir…
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
The margin of victory of an election is a useful measure to capture the robustness of an election outcome. It also plays a crucial role in determining the sample size of various al…
Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete infor…
Frugal Bribery in Voting
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the n…
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement
Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar +1
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The re…