activity
20092026
most citedAn Iterative Transfer Learning Based Ensemble Technique for Automatic Short Answer Grading

13 citations · 34 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

18 papers

cs.LG2026

Learning Principal-Agent Contracts for Equitable Smallholder Carbon Farming under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Rishi Bharadwaj, Yadati Narahari

Agricultural soils are a major untapped carbon sink. Carbon farming is emerging as a promising practice for tapping this potential. Smallholder farmers, who dominate agriculture ac…

econ.TH2025

On Probabilistic Assignment Rules

Sreedurga Gogulapati, Yadati Narahari, Souvik Roy +1

We study the classical assignment problem with initial endowments in a probabilistic framework. In this setting, each agent initially owns an object and has strict preferences over…

cs.GT2020

On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings

Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y Narahari

The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairne…

cs.GT2020

On the Coexistence of Stability and Incentive Compatibility in Fractional Matchings

Shivika Narang, Y Narahari

Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched.…

cs.LG2019★ 1 cited

Achieving Fairness in Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problem

Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair +1

We study an interesting variant of the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, called the Fair-SMAB problem, where each arm is required to be pulled for at least a given fraction of…

cs.SI2017★ 4 cited

Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-based Preference Aggregation

Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith D. Vallam, Y. Narahari

Given a large population, it is an intensive task to gather individual preferences over a set of alternatives and arrive at an aggregate or collective preference of the population.…