31 citations · 144 across the 37 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers · 1 filter
Deep Learning Based Auction Design for Selling Agricultural Produce through Farmer Collectives to Maximize Nash Social Welfare
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Bazil Ahmed +2
This paper is motivated by the need to design a robust market mechanism to benefit farmers (producers of agricultural produce) as well as buyers of agricultural produce (consumers)…
Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications
V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj +1
Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired propertie…
Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy +1
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensive…
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Yadati Narahari
Participatory budgeting (PB) has attracted much attention in recent times due to its wide applicability in social choice settings. In this paper, we consider indivisible PB which i…
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari +1
We study coverage problems in which, for a set of agents and a given threshold , the goal is to select subsets (of the agents) that, while satisfying combinatorial constrain…
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a popular voting method by which a limited budget is divided among a set of projects, based on the preferences of voters over the projects. PB is br…