8 citations · 24 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 2 filters
The Polyhedral Geometry of Truthful Auctions
Michael Joswig, Max Klimm, Sylvain Spitz
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the differ…
Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm +1
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic…
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon +1
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own cha…