8 citations · 24 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
19 papers · 1 filter
Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be random…
Optimal Impartial Correspondences
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We study mechanisms that select a subset of the vertex set of a directed graph in order to maximize the minimum indegree of any selected vertex, subject to an impartiality constrai…
Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs
Max Klimm, Maximilian J. Stahlberg
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choic…
The Polyhedral Geometry of Truthful Auctions
Michael Joswig, Max Klimm, Sylvain Spitz
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the differ…
Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm +1
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic…
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon +1
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own cha…