2 citations · 2 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Constant Individual Regret in General Games
Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar
Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove…
Equilibrium with Internal Transfers
Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar
Nash equilibrium (NE) arises from selfish utility maximization, yet its social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Moreover, computing an NE is intractable in general. We…
Regret Minimization with Adaptive Opponents in Repeated Games
Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu +1
In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of \emph{external regre…
Computing Equilibrium beyond Unilateral Deviation
Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no…
Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation with Ranking Feedback
Mingyang Liu, Yongshan Chen, Zhiyuan Fan +3
Online learning in arbitrary, and possibly adversarial, environments has been extensively studied in sequential decision-making, and it is closely connected to equilibrium computat…