4 papers · 1 filter
Fair Team Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivizes the team of agents to exert cos…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…
The Design of Monopoly Information Broker
Junjie Chen, Takuro Yamashita
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a meta…