8 papers
Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-reve…
Fair Team Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivizes the team of agents to exert cos…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…
The Design of Monopoly Information Broker
Junjie Chen, Takuro Yamashita
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a meta…
Machine Unlearning in Forgettability Sequence
Junjie Chen, Qian Chen, Jian Lou +3
Machine unlearning (MU) is becoming a promising paradigm to achieve the "right to be forgotten", where the training trace of any chosen data points could be eliminated, while maint…
Hiring for An Uncertain Task: Joint Design of Information and Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen
In this paper, we initiate the computational problem of jointly designing information and contracts. We consider three possible classes of contracts with decreasing flexibility and…
A Reduction from Multi-Parameter to Single-Parameter Bayesian Contract Design
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Minming Li +2
The main result of this paper is an almost approximation-preserving polynomial-time reduction from the most general multi-parameter Bayesian contract design (BCD) to single-paramet…