1 citations · 1 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained princ…
Risk-Averse and Optimistic Advertiser Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding
Christopher Liaw, Wennan Zhu
The rise of auto-bidding has created challenges for ensuring advertiser incentive compatibility, particularly when advertisers delegate bidding to agents with high-level constraint…
Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw +2
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given b…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan Zhu
We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of…