1 citations · 2 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Cogentic: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Automated Proof Discovery
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
We present Cogentic, a multi-agent harness for automated proof discovery on open research problems. While frontier language models can generate strong mathematical ideas in a singl…
Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding
Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta +2
Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent exa…
Efficiency of Generalized Proportional First-Price Auctions Under Auto-bidding
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
Auto-bidding is now widely adopted in online advertising platforms, allowing advertisers to specify high-level campaign objectives--such as maximizing total value subject to a retu…
Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values…
The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +5
We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from and unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from…
Prediction with Expert Advice: Anytime Regret with Many Experts Matches the Fixed-Time Constant
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
Prediction with expert advice is a fundamental problem in online learning. When the time horizon is known in advance, the minimax cumulative regret over experts is asymptot…
Efficient Online Inverse Optimization with Regret
Yang Cai, Anupam Gupta, Vineet Gupta +7
We give a deterministic algorithm for online inverse linear optimization with regret , uniform in the horizon and time per round. A bound of this order was obtaine…
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained princ…
A Unified Approach to Submodular Maximization Under Noise
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yang Cai, Zhe Feng +2
We consider the problem of maximizing a submodular function with access to a noisy value oracle for the function instead of an exact value oracle. Similar to prior work, we assume…
Risk-Averse and Optimistic Advertiser Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding
Christopher Liaw, Wennan Zhu
The rise of auto-bidding has created challenges for ensuring advertiser incentive compatibility, particularly when advertisers delegate bidding to agents with high-level constraint…
Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw +2
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given b…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan Zhu
We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of…