10 papers
Truthful and Expected-Payment-Optimal Model Routing in Graph-Based Agentic Workflows
Jiayuan Liu, Mingyu Guo, Jiarui Gan +1
Assigning routine tasks to cheaper large language model (LLM) providers can reduce generation cost, but switching providers may require processing accumulated context again. Keepin…
Strat-Reasoner: Reinforcing Strategic Reasoning of LLMs in Multi-Agent Games
Yidong He, Yutao Lai, Pengxu Yang +4
While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in certain reasoning tasks, they struggle in multi-agent games where the final outcome depends on the joint strategies of all agents. In mu…
The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the Probability of Matching Being Large Enough
Haris Aziz, Jiarui Gan, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We consider a matching problem, which is meaningful in team competitions, as well as in information theory, recommender systems, and assignment problems. In the competitions which…
Incentive-Aware Multi-Fidelity Optimization for Generative Advertising in Large Language Models
Jiayuan Liu, Barry Wang, Jiarui Gan +4
Generative advertising in large language model (LLM) responses requires optimizing sponsorship configurations under two strict constraints: the strategic behavior of advertisers an…
Persuading Stable Matching
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in…
Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games
Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this s…
Strategyproof Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
Thomas Kleine Buening, Jiarui Gan, Debmalya Mandal +1
We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own pre…
Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Jiarui Gan, Matteo Castiglioni +2
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitou…
Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus
We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to t…
Persuading a Credible Agent
Jiarui Gan, Abheek Ghosh, Nicholas Teh
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the…