5 papers
Persuading Stable Matching
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in…
Value-Set Iteration: Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon Multi-Player Stochastic Games
Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this s…
Strategyproof Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
Thomas Kleine Buening, Jiarui Gan, Debmalya Mandal +1
We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own pre…
Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Jiarui Gan, Matteo Castiglioni +2
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitou…
Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, Sarit Kraus
We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to t…