22 citations · 87 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
21 papers
Markov Decision Processes with Time-Varying Geometric Discounting
Jiarui Gan, Annika Hennes, Rupak Majumdar +2
Canonical models of Markov decision processes (MDPs) usually consider geometric discounting based on a constant discount factor. While this standard modeling approach has led to ma…
Stochastic Principal-Agent Problems: Efficient Computation and Learning
Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar, Debmalya Mandal +1
We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the othe…
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu +1
This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equili…
k-Prize Weighted Voting Games
Wei-Chen Lee, David Hyland, Alessandro Abate +5
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly…
Learning to Manipulate a Commitment Optimizer
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jiarui Gan +1
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computat…
Online Reinforcement Learning with Uncertain Episode Lengths
Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic, Jiarui Gan +2
Existing episodic reinforcement algorithms assume that the length of an episode is fixed across time and known a priori. In this paper, we consider a general framework of episodic…
Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu +1
In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal…
Socially Fair Reinforcement Learning
Debmalya Mandal, Jiarui Gan
We consider the problem of episodic reinforcement learning where there are multiple stakeholders with different reward functions. Our goal is to output a policy that is socially fa…
Admissible Policy Teaching through Reward Design
Kiarash Banihashem, Adish Singla, Jiarui Gan +1
We study reward design strategies for incentivizing a reinforcement learning agent to adopt a policy from a set of admissible policies. The goal of the reward designer is to modify…
Approximately Envy-Free Budget-Feasible Allocation
Jiarui Gan, Bo Li, Xiaowei Wu
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total siz…
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Decision-Making
Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar, Goran Radanovic +1
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed…
Budget-feasible Maximum Nash Social Welfare Allocation is Almost Envy-free
Xiaowei Wu, Bo Li, Jiarui Gan
The Nash social welfare (NSW) is a well-known social welfare measurement that balances individual utilities and the overall efficiency. In the context of fair allocation of indivis…
Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities
Jiarui Gan, Bo Li, Yingkai Li
We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited n…
Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
Georgios Birmpas, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Hollender +3
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to…
Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs
Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan +1
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirec…
Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots
Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Svetlana Obraztsova +2
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party…
Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to Counteract
Jiarui Gan, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh +2
In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with…
Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems
Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
We consider the house allocation problem, where houses are to be assigned to agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that d…
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo +3
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with t…
Schelling Games on Graphs
Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Ayumi Igarashi +2
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on…
On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games
Qingyu Guo, Jiarui Gan, Fei Fang +3
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the…