2 citations · 2 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
This paper studies school choice when each school has an original priority order and an adjusted priority order reflecting policies such as affirmative action. We introduce a weak…
Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
This paper compares the stable improvement cycles (SIC) mechanism of Erdil and Ergin (2008) with the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) mechanism of Kesten (2010) in sc…
Complete Exchange Mechanisms
Minoru Kitahara, Hiroshi Uno
This paper studies one-sided matching under a complete exchange (CE) requirement, where each agent must be assigned an object different from its initial endowment. We introduce ass…
A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structu…
School Choice with Multiple Priorities
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since th…
On extensions of partial priorities in school choice
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
We consider a school choice matching model where the priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be weak order. We focus on the (total order) extensions…