3 papers
econ.TH2025
Complete Exchange Mechanisms
Minoru Kitahara, Hiroshi Uno
This paper studies one-sided matching under a complete exchange (CE) requirement, where each agent must be assigned an object different from its initial endowment. We introduce ass…
econ.GN2025
A conditional match rate anomaly and ranking pressure in residency matching programs
Munetomo Ando, Minoru Kitahara
In the medical residency matching markets of the U.S. and Japan, we observe that an applicant's probability of matching with their first-listed program is disproportionately higher…
econ.TH2025
A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules
Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structu…