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cs.GT2026
Settling the Complexity Landscape of Multi-Agent Contracts with Binary Actions
Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger, Shay Shani
We study the computational complexity of optimal contract design in the multi-agent binary-action model, focusing on gross-substitutes reward functions and related classes. While a…
cs.GT2026
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman +1
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of actions, via a…
cs.GT2026
Equal-Pay Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward f…